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Abstract—The Regional Transmission Operators each have
unique methods to procure frequency regulation reserves used to
track real power fluctuations on the grid. Some market clearing
practices result in high regulation prices with large spread
compared to other markets. We present the frequency regulation
market clearing formulations–as derived from operator tariffs–of
the ISO New England, PJM Interconnection, and Midcontinent
ISO. We offer test case examples to explain the historic market
pricing behavior seen within each system operator and conclude
this behavior is due to the inclusion of estimated lost opportunity
costs in market clearing.
Index Terms—RTO/ISO, power system economics, system
dispatch, frequency regulation, ancillary services, opportunity
costs
I. INTRODUCTION
Frequency regulation reserves are used to correct the short-
term frequency imbalances which occur during the normal
operation of the grid. Frequency regulation is the injection or
withdrawal of real power by facilities capable of responding
to a system operator’s automatic generation control (AGC)
signal.
The seven Regional Transmission Operators (RTO) / Inde-
pendent System Operators (ISO) in the United States each
maintain a wholesale market to compensate resources for pro-
viding frequency regulating reserves. There are two regulation
market clearing prices (RMCP) calculated: capacity (RMCCP)
and performance (RMPCP). Regulation capacity ensures a
resource is available to provide this service while regulation
performance quantifies a resource’s movement in response to
AGC signals.
We presented a review of the ISO New England (ISO-NE),
the PJM Interconnection (PJM), and the Midcontinent ISO
(MISO) in [1]. That work included the statistics of the 2018
hourly RMCPs for the three operators, shown in Fig. 1. We
hypothesized that the large spread seen in some market prices
is related to the inclusion of estimated lost opportunity costs
in the market clearing. This work complements that review by
presenting the regulation market clearing formulations of the
three RTOs and explores reasons for the pricing behavior.
II. MARKET CLEARING FORMULATIONS
This work presents regulation market clearing formulations
for each RTO as a means to compare the three markets. Most
Fig. 1. 2018 hourly regulation market capacity (RMCCP) and performance
(RMPCP) clearing prices and ISO-NE, PJM, and MISO by season. Boxes
include first, second and third quartiles, whiskers include 1.5 IQR.
RTOs do not publish their clearing formulations. All formula-
tions presented here are derived from the legal descriptions in
each RTO’s Business Practice Manuals and Tariffs. The system
operators each have unique ways of optimizing regulation in
regards to energy and contingency reserves, so these products
are included in the market formulations. Transmission network
equations are ignored in these formulations. More detailed
descriptions of the electricity products are in [1].
Though all markets have unique naming conventions and
market constraints, we use consistent variables and nomencla-
ture when possible. The unique naming convention of each
RTO is identified in the corresponding section.
Nomenclature
System Parameters (MW)
P , P¯ minimum and maximum resource limits
P¯d energy demand requirement
R¯cap, R¯per regulation capacity and performance requirements
R¯10, R¯30 10- and 30-min contingency reserve requirements
R¯syn, R¯sup Synchronous and supplemental reserve requirements
Resource Parameters ($/MWh)
cp offer price for energy
ccap, cper offer price for regulation capacity ($/MWh) and perfor-
mance ($/MW)
csyn, cnon,
csup
offer price for synchronous, non-synchronous, and sup-
plemental reserves
c˜loc, cloc estimated and real-time incremental opportunity cost
pi incremental avoided cost
V Vickrey payment ($)
Ro maximum regulation capacity offer (MW)
ρ ramp rate of resource (MW/min)
t length of dispatch interval (min)
α historic mileage ratio or deployment performance (1/hr)
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Dispatch Variables (MW)
P energy dispatch
Rcap, Rper regulation capacity and performance dispatch
R1 regulation capacity dispatch as regulation
R2 regulation capacity dispatch as operating reserve
Rsyn,
Rnon, Rsup
synchronous, non-synchronous, non-synchronous reserve
dispatch
Clearing Prices ($/MWh)
γ˜, γ estimated and real-time locational marginal price
µcap, µper ,
µ
regulation capacity, performance, and total market clear-
ing price
Sets
i all resources
j resources providing regulation (j ∈ i)
k, l,m resources providing synchronous, non-synchronous, sup-
plemental reserves (k, l,m ∈ i)
f resources in forward market, or previous step (f ∈ i)
A. ISO New England
1) Market Summary: ISO New England has ancillary ser-
vices for regulation, 10-minute spinning (synchronous) re-
serves, 10-minute non-synchronous reserves, and 30-minute
operating (supplemental) reserves. ISO-NE treats its two
regulation components–capacity and service–as independent
market products, each of which must be dispatched to meet
an independent system requirement based on historic perfor-
mance [2].
In real-time, all three contingency reserve products are co-
optimized with energy, but regulating reserves are procured
independently one hour ahead of the real-time energy and
contingency reserve market. ISO-NE selects regulation prod-
ucts based on economic merit order considering a two-part
regulation offer and estimated incremental opportunity costs.
Resource-specific incremental opportunity costs are estimated
for each eligible resource using estimated energy market
conditions before real-time [3].
The regulation service clearing price is simply the most
expensive bid from all accepted regulation offers [2].
The regulation capacity clearing price is set using a Vickrey
auction design. According to this design, a resource’s reg-
ulation Vickrey payment should include it’s cost of provid-
ing regulation capacity, cost of providing regulation service,
incremental opportunity cost and the incremental avoided
cost the resource provides to the system [4]. The latter can
be calculated explicitly by solving the frequency regulation
market both with and without the individual resource and
taking the difference in the objective value [2], as shown in
Eq. (1) for resource j. The optimal Vickrey payment owed to
resource j is shown in Eq. (2). The regulation capacity market
clearing price is set equal to the residual of total Vickrey
payment after subtracting estimated mileage payments [4].
Incremental Avoided Cost:
pij = f
∗(j /∈ i)− f∗(j ∈ i) (1)
Vickrey Payment:
Vj = (ccap,j + cloc,j) ·Rcap,j + cper,j ·Rper,j + pij (2)
2) Market Clearing Formulation: The regulation capacity
dispatch resulting from hourly regulation market clearing is
used as an input into the real-time energy and operating reserve
markets for the next hour. The expected regulation service is
considered an optimization variable in the regulation market.
The regulation market clearing formulation is presented in
Eq. (3). Constraints (3a) - (3c) define the range and ramp
constraints on both regulation components. β in (3b) is the
maximum deployment ratio for regulation service. This could
be resource specific, but is– at most–the product of twice the
total Rcap range and the number of AGC signals sent within
the regulation dispatch interval [5]. Constraints (3d) and (3e)
define the system regulation capacity and service requirements.
The estimated incremental opportunity cost is defined in (3f)
using a forecasted energy price [3].
The real-time energy and reserve market clearing formula-
tion is presented in Eq. (4). This market takes the regulation
capacity dispatch (Rcap) from Eq. (3) as a fixed input in
power generation constraints (4a) and (4b). Constraints (4c) -
(4c) define the system energy, 10-min and 30-min contingency
reserve needs, respectively.
The regulation market clearing prices are defined in Eq. (5).
Regulation Market:
min (ccap + c˜loc)
T Rcap + c
T
perRper (3)
s.t. Rcap,j ≤ 1
2
(
P¯j − P j
)
(a)
Rper,j ≤ β ·Rcap,j (b)
Rper,j ≤ t · ρj ·Rcap,j (c)∑
j
Rcap,j ≥ R¯cap (d)∑
j
Rper,j ≥ R¯per (e)
Rcap, Rper ≥ 0
c˜loc = γ˜ − cp (f)
Dispatched: Rcap
Co-Optimized Energy and Contingency Reserve Market:
min cTp P + c
T
synRsyn + c
T
nonRnon + c
T
supRsup (4)
s.t. Pi +Rcap,f +Rsyn,k +Rsup,m ≤ P¯i (a)
Pi −Rcap,f ≥ P i (b)∑
i
Pi = P¯d (c)∑
f
Rnon,f +
∑
l
Rnon,l +
∑
k
Rsyn,k ≥ R¯10 (d)∑
f
Rsup,f +
∑
m
Rsup,m ≥ R¯30 (e)
P,Rsyn, Rnon, Rsum ≥ 0
Dispatched: P,Rsyn, Rnon, Rsup
Market Prices:
µ = µper + µcap (5)
µper = max{cper,j} for Rper,j 6= 0 (a)
µcap =
∑
j Vj −
∑
j Rper,j · µper∑
j Rcap,j
(b)
B. PJM Interconnection
1) Market Summary: PJM has ancillary service products
for regulating reserves, 10-minute synchronous reserves, 10-
minute non-synchronous reserves, and 30-minute supplemen-
tal reserves. Regulation reserves are procured on the operating
day one hour ahead of dispatch. Though not independent reg-
ulation products, PJM splits regulation into two components–
capability and performance.
PJM clears energy and ancillary services using a multi-step
process. The two relevant steps for this work are the An-
cillary Service Optimizer (ASO) and the Real-Time Security
Constrained Economic Dispatch (RT SCED). The ASO jointly
optimizes energy and all reserves in order to commit regulating
and non-dispatchable contingency reserves [6]. An estimated
opportunity cost is considered in the ASO to clear the market
and the resulting regulation dispatch commitments are used as
inputs in the RT SCED [7].
2) Market Clearing Formulation: Eq. (6) shows the ASO
step. The objective function minimizes the cost of regulation
including the capability offers, the performance offers scaled
by the mileage ratio, and an estimated incremental lost op-
portunity cost using the day-ahead energy LMP. Constraints
(6a) and (6b) define the power dispatch limits. Constraint (6c)
limits regulation capacity dispatch to the resource specified
limit. Constraints (6d) - (6g) define the system requirements
for energy demand, regulation capacity, synchronous reserves,
and 10-minute contingency reserves, respectively. The incre-
mental opportunity cost based on day-ahead energy estimates
is defined in Eq. (6h).
Eq. (7) shows the RT SCED step. Constraints (7a) and (7b)
define the power dispatch limits. Constraints (7c) - (7e) define
the system requirements for energy demand, synchronous
reserves, and 10-minute contingency reserves, respectively.
Ancillary Service Optimizer:
min cTp P + (ccap + α · cper + c˜loc)T Rcap + cTsynRsyn + cTnonRnon
(6)
s.t. Pi +Rcap,j +Rsyn,f +Rsup,f +Rsyn,k ≤ P¯i (a)
Pi −Rcap,j ≥ P i (b)
Rcap,j ≤ Ro,j (c)∑
i
Pi = P¯d (d)∑
j
Rcap,j ≥ R¯cap (e)∑
f
Rsyn,f +
∑
k
Rsyn,k ≥ R¯syn (f)∑
f
(
Rsyn,f +Rnon,f
)
+
∑
k
Rsyn,k +
∑
l
Rnon,l ≥ R¯10 (g)
P,Rcap, Rsyn, Rnon ≥ 0
c˜loc = (γ˜ − cp) (h)
Dispatched: Rcap
Real-Time Security Constrained Economic Dispatch:
min cTp P + c
T
synRsyn + c
T
nonRnon (7)
s.t. Pi +Rcap,f +Rsyn,f +Rsup,f +Rsyn,k ≤ P¯i (a)
Pi −Rcap,f ≥ P i (b)∑
i
Pi = P¯d (c)∑
f
Rsyn,f +
∑
k
Rsyn,k ≥ R¯syn (d)∑
f
(
Rsyn,f +Rnon,f
)
+
∑
k
Rsyn,k +
∑
l
Rnon,l ≥ R¯10 (e)
P,Rsyn, Rnon ≥ 0
Dispatched: P,Rsyn, Rnon
Market Prices:
µ = max{ccap + α · cper + cloc} forRcap,j 6= 0 (8)
µper = max{cper} forRcap,j 6= 0 (a)
µcap = µ− µper (b)
cloc = γ − cp (c)
Resource-specific incremental lost opportunity cost prices
are re-calculated using the real-time LMP for use in pricing
[8]. The marginal resource sets the RMCP, shown in Eq. (8),
and the RMPCP is simply the highest adjusted performance
offer of the committed resources, shown in Eq. (8a). Different
resources can set the RMCP and RMPCP [8]. The RMCCP is
the difference between the RMCP and the RMPCP, shown in
Eq. (8b). The RMCCP will include both regulation capability
offers and incremental opportunity costs.
C. Midcontinent ISO
1) Market Summary: The Midcontinent ISO energy and
reserve products of interest here are energy, regulating re-
serves, spinning reserves, and supplemental reserves. MISO’s
regulation reserves components are capacity and mileage.
Regulation capacity is dispatched to meet pre-determined
reserve zone requirements [9]. Regulation mileage is estimated
for each generator selected to provide capacity using historic
performance information.
MISO clears all energy and reserve products simultaneously
both day-ahead (DA) and in real-time (RT) using a co-
optimized security-constrained economic dispatch (SCED) for-
mulation. The clearing price for each product is the marginal
cost of providing that product to the grid, following marginal
pricing theory [10]. The regulation market clearing price,
therefore, guarantees recovery of operating reserve cost offers
and the opportunity cost of energy re-dispatch for cleared
operating reserves. MISO does calculate a separate regulation
mileage price, but not a separate regulation capacity price [11].
2) Market Clearing Formulation: A simplified real-time
clearing formulation for MISO is shown in Eq. (9).
Because regulation reserves can substitute for contingency
reserves, MISO splits regulating reserves into two categories:
those dispatched to meet regulation requirements (R1) and
those dispatched to meet contingency reserves (R2) [5]. Sep-
arating regulation in this ways allows for the appropriate
resource offers to be applied to each. A combined regulation
offer is used to select R1 regulating reserves, where the
regulation mileage offer is scale by the market-wide, historic
deployment performance ratio (α) as shown in (9h).
Constraints (9a) and (9b) define the generator limits when
providing regulation. Constraint (9c) limits the regulating re-
serves to less than the resource specified offer. Constraints (9d)
- (9g) define the system energy demand, regulating reserve
requirement, spinning reserve requirement, and total operating
reserve requirement, respectively.
The regulation market clearing price is defined as the
marginal cost of providing that reserve product to the system
[5]. As shown in Eq. (10), the RMCP is the sum of the shadow
prices (η) related to meeting regulation, spinning and operating
reserve constraints from Eq. (9). The mileage market price is
the highest accepted offer, as shown in (10a).
Security Constrained Economic Dispatch:
min cTp P + c
T
regR
1 + cTcapR
2 + cTsynRsyn + c
T
supRsup (9)
s.t. Pi +R1j +R
2
j +Rsyn,k +Rsup,m ≤ P¯i (a)
Pi −R1j ≥ P i (b)
R1j +R
2
j ≤ Ro (c)∑
i
Pi = P¯d (d)∑
j
R1j ≥ R¯cap (e)∑
j
(
R1j +R
2
j
)
+
∑
k
Rsyn,k ≥ R¯cap + R¯syn (f)∑
j
(
R1j +R
2
j
)
+
∑
k
Rsyn,k +
∑
m
Rsup,m ≥
R¯cap + R¯syn + R¯sup (g)
P,R1, R2, Rsyn, Rsup ≥ 0
creg = ccap + α · cper (h)
Dispatched: P,R1, R2, Rsyn, Rsup
Market Prices:
µ = ηe + ηf + ηg (10)
µper = max{cper,j} whenR1j 6= 0 (a)
III. MARKET CLEARING TEST CASE
In [1] we hypothesized that the relatively large spread in
some regulation clearing prices seen in Fig. 1 were due to the
inclusion of an estimated incremental lost opportunity cost. If
this value was determined using a poor forecast of the real-
time system demand needs, a suboptimal dispatch could occur.
We test this hypothesis using the regulation market clearing
formulations for each RTO with different forecasted and real-
time power demand conditions. We present first a small 5-
generator test case to show the effects of a poor demand
forecast on both dispatch and clearing prices. We then present
the clearing price statistics for simulated random demand
conditions of a 50-generator economic dispatch example.
TABLE I
CHARACTERISTICS OF FIVE GENERATORS USED IN THE MARKET
CLEARING EXAMPLES.
Generator: A B C D E
ρ (MW/min) 5 6 1 10 5
cp ($/MWh) 10.00 20.00 15.00 18.00 12.00
ccap ($/MWh) 2.50 15.00 6.50 12.00 7.00
cper ($/MWh) 1.00 1.50 0.50 2.00 2.00
A. Five Generator Example
Two example economic dispatches using different demand
forecasts are presented here. The presented clearing formula-
tions are applied to a five generator example. We clear the
same market test case when the forecasted conditions match
the real-time conditions and when they differ.
Five generators with power dispatch capabilities between
0 and 100 MW are available to serve system demand and
required regulation. The ramp rates and cost offers of the
five example generators are shown in Table I. All generators
are available to provide 50 MW of regulation capacity and
respond to 4-sec AGC signals. The system requires 420 MW
of power demand and 25 MW of required regulation capacity.
The hourly required system mileage is set to 80 MW, either
explicitly in the case of ISO-NE or by setting the historic
mileage ratio (α) to 3.2 in the case of PJM and MISO.
1) Matched P¯d Conditions: For the first dispatch example,
the same market conditions were used in the forecasted energy
clearing as in the real-time. This ensures that the estimated
incremental opportunity costs (c˜loc) used in market clearing
by ISO-NE and PJM match the real-time incremental oppor-
tunity costs used in market pricing. The resulting generator
dispatch instructions and clearing prices are shown in Table
II. The assigned mileage (Rper) in ISO-NE represents dispatch
instructions. The assigned mileage (R∗per) in PJM and MISO
represents an assumed mileage if the resources dispatched for
regulation capacity move at the assigned mileage ratio of 3.2.
ISO-NE and MISO have very similar energy and regulation
capacity dispatches. ISO-NE differs from MISO only to meet
their independent regulation service requirement, choosing the
generator with the lowest performance offer (Generator C) to
provide the majority of mileage. ISO-NE clears the lowest
prices of all three RTOs in this example.
PJM dispatches the most expensive generator (Generator
B) to provide the majority of regulation, maximizing the
amount of energy provided by less expensive generators.
PJM’s clearing method minimizes generator lost opportunity
costs without consideration to avoided costs. PJM makes a
suboptimal dispatch choice in this example, increasing both
regulation clearing prices.
2) Mismatched P¯d Conditions: In this second dispatch
example, the forecasted system power demand is only 40%
of the real-time power demand condition. This demand forces
different binding constraints and subsequently lowers the
forecasted energy clearing price and estimated incremental
opportunity costs (c˜loc) used in market clearing by ISO-NE
TABLE II
GENERATOR DISPATCH AND MARKET CLEARING PRICES GIVEN
FORECASTED ENERGY CONDITIONS THAT MATCH REAL-TIME
CONDITIONS.
ISO New England
γ = 20.00 $/MWh µcap = 13.73 $/MWh µper = 1.00 $/MWh
A B C D E
P (MW) 80.00 45.00 95.00 100.00 100.00
Rcap (MW) 20.00 0 5.00 0 0
Rper (MW) 1.67 0 5.00 0 0
PJM Interconnect
γ = 20.00 $/MWh µcap = 18.30 $/MWh µper = 1.50 $/MWh
A B C D E
P (MW) 100.00 25.00 95.00 100.00 100.00
Rcap (MW) 0 20.00 5.00 0 0
R∗per (MW) 0 5.33 1.33 0 0
Midcontinent ISO
γ = 20.00 $/MWh µ = 15.70 $/MWh µper = 1.00 $/MWh
A B C D E
P (MW) 80.00 45.00 95.00 100.00 100.00
Rcap (MW) 20.00 0 5.00 0 0
R∗per (MW) 5.33 0 1.33 0 0
and PJM. All other system conditions are unchanged. The
resulting generator dispatch instructions and clearing prices
are shown in Table III.
Both ISO-NE and PJM make regulation dispatch decisions
based on the poorly estimated incremental opportunity costs
and the resulting energy and regulation dispatches differ from
Table II when the day-ahead energy conditions matched real-
time conditions for ISO-NE and PJM. Most notably, the ISO-
NE regulation capacity clearing price and both PJM regulation
clearing prices all decreased significantly. MISO’s dispatch
instructions and clearing prices remained unchanged between
the two dispatch examples.
B. Fifty Generator Example
This same method was applied to a larger system case using
8760 trials to determine the spread in regulation clearing prices
that result. The forecasted energy demand was allowed to
fluctuate between 50% and 125% of the real-time demand
for a 50-generator system. All other inputs were unchanged
between the 8760 trials. The resulting statistics for these trials
are presented in Table IV.
The only clearing prices which experience any variance
between trials are the RMCCP for ISO-NE and PJM, and
the RMPCP for PJM. This corroborates the findings in the
5-generator example and matches the behavior seen in Fig. 1.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The market clearing practices of the ISO New England, PJM
Interconnect and Midcontinent ISO differ widely. Operators
strive to reduce overall system costs given the many energy
and reserve products, but the method by which frequency
regulating reserves are optimized with energy can result in
different dispatches given identical system conditions. The
inclusion of lost opportunity costs in the market clearing
TABLE III
GENERATOR DISPATCH AND MARKET CLEARING PRICES GIVEN A
MISMATCH IN REAL-TIME AND FORECASTED CONDITIONS. THE POWER
DEMAND FORECAST WAS 40% OF REAL-TIME DEMAND, RESULTING IN
LOW INCREMENTAL OPPORTUNITY COST ESTIMATES (c˜loc).
ISO New England
γ = 20.00 $/MWh µcap = 6.93 $/MWh µper = 1.00 $/MWh
A B C D E
P (MW) 75.03 45.00 99.97 100.00 100.00
Rcap (MW) 24.97 0 0.03 0 0
Rper (MW) 1.67 0 5.00 0 0
PJM Interconnect
γ = 20.00 $/MWh µcap = 14.70 $/MWh µper = 1.00 $/MWh
A B C D E
P (MW) 80.00 45.00 95.00 100.00 100.00
Rcap (MW) 20.00 0 5.00 0 0
R∗per (MW) 5.33 0 1.33 0 0
Midcontinent ISO
γ = 20.00 $/MWh µ = 15.70 $/MWh µper = 1.00 $/MWh
A B C D E
P (MW) 80.00 45.00 95.00 100.00 100.00
Rcap (MW) 20.00 0 5.00 0 0
R∗per (MW) 5.33 0 1.33 0 0
TABLE IV
STATISTICS OF MARKET CLEARING PRICES FOR EACH RTO GIVEN A
50-GENERATOR SYSTEM WITH 8760 TRIALS. THE FORECASTED ENERGY
DEMAND WAS THE ONLY INPUT PERMITTED TO FLUCTUATE BETWEEN
TRIALS. ENERGY PRICE STATISTICS WERE THE SAME FOR ALL RTOS.
minimum mean maximum variance
Energy γ˜ 30.50 40.69 60.00 56.98
γ 41.00 41.00 41.00 0
ISONE µcap 4.31 4.68 6.59 0.45
µper 1.00 1.00 1.00 0
PJM µcap 16.75 16.85 17.50 0.04
µper 2.50 3.41 4.00 0.54
MISO µcap 19.25 19.25 19.25 0
µper 2.50 2.50 2.50 0
formulations were found to have a large impact on regulation
market pricing behavior. Regulation markets that are cleared
before the energy markets must rely on an estimated power
demand condition. If this demand estimate differs from real-
time, then a suboptimal dispatch could occur.
Historic regulation market clearing prices show a large
spread in some prices among the RTOs. This behavior was
replicated using modeled test case systems when the forecasted
energy demand differed from real-time conditions. This sup-
ports the observation that suboptimal dispatch decisions could
be made on poorly estimated lost opportunity costs.
The test cases included here did not consider the affect
of generator bids on regulation market prices. Variability in
generator energy bids could also contribute to the wide spread
of regulation clearing prices. Forecasted power demand is only
one component of regulation market clearing prices, and only
partially explains historic pricing behavior.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The authors would like to thank Mr. Bill Henson of ISO-NE
and Dr. Yonghong Chen of MISO for their guidance in this
work. PJM did not return request for review on this work.
This material is based upon work supported by the National
Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship Program
under Grant No. DGE-1256259. Any opinions, findings, and
conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are
those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of
the National Science Foundation. Support was also provided
by the Graduate School and the Office of the Vice Chancellor
for Research and Graduate Education at the University of
Wisconsin-Madison with funding from the Wisconsin Alumni
Research Foundation.
A. Brooks acknowledges that this work was performed
at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, which occupies an-
cestral Ho-Chunk land—a place known to their nation as
Teejop—which was forcibly ceded in an 1832 treaty. She
further acknowledges the invaluable labor of the maintenance
and clerical staff at this institution.
REFERENCES
[1] A. E. Brooks and B. C. Lesieutre, “A review of frequency regulation
markets in three u.s. iso/rtos,” The Electricity Journal, vol. 32, December
2019.
[2] ISO New England, “Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff: Section
III: Market Rule 1: Standard Market Design,” June 2018. Docket #
ER18-1287-000.
[3] W. Henson. Personal communication with the author, March 2019.
[4] Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Prepared Direct Testimony of
Peter Cramton on Behalf of ISO New England Inc., April 2012. Order
No. 755 Compliance.
[5] Y. Chen, R. Leonard, M. Keyser, and J. Gardner, “Development of
performance-based two-part regulating reserve compensation on MISO
energy and ancillary service market,” IEEE Transactions on Power
Systems, vol. 30, Jan 2015.
[6] PJM Interconnection, “Regulation intro, offers, and clearing.” Member
training presentation, July 2017.
[7] PJM Interconnection, “PJM reserve market: Resouce commitment, clear-
ing and pricing.” Member training presentation, March 2018.
[8] C. M. Velasco, “Regulation market overview.” Member training presen-
tation, October 2015. PJM Interconnection.
[9] Y. Chen, P. Gribik, and J. Gardner, “Incorporating post zonal reserve
deployment transmission constraints into energy and ancillary service
co-optimization,” IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, vol. 29, March
2014.
[10] F. D. Galiana, F. Bouffard, J. M. Arroyo, and J. F. Restrepo, “Scheduling
and pricing of coupled energy and primary, secondary, and tertiary
reserves,” Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 93, November 2005.
[11] Midcontinent ISO, Business Practice Manual: Energy and Operating
Reserves, 2017. BPM-002-r18.
